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I. Introduction
If experts say a "malicious [cyber] code"' has "similar effects"2
to a "physical bomb,"' and that code actually causes "a stunning
breach of global internet stability,"4 is it really accurate to call that
t General Dunlap is a Professor of the Practice and the Executive Director of the Center
on Law, Ethics and National Security at Duke University School of Law having retired
from the Air Force's Judge Advocate General Corps in 2010 after more than 34 years of
service. The author wishes to than Ms. Kathleen Cusack and Ms. Amy Richardson for
their invaluable assistance with this article.
1 Joseph Menn et al., Cyber Attacks Disrupt PayPal, Twitter, Other Sites, REUTERS
(Oct. 21, 2016, 9:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-
idUSKCN12LIME [https://perma.cc/XR8H-XQ3M].
2 Sara Ashley O'Brien, 'Unprecedented' Cyberattack Involved Tens of Millions of
IP Addresses, CNN (Oct. 22, 2016, 6:57 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/22/technology/dyn-cyberattack/ [https://perma.cc/RRY2-
YDBB].
3 Id.
4 Menn et al., supra note 1.
event merely an instance of a "cyber attack"?s
Moreover, can you really expect to deter state and non-state
actors from employing such code and similarly hostile cyber
methodologies if all they think that they are risking is being
labeled as a cyber-vandal subject only to law enforcement
measures? Or might they act differently if it were made clear to
them that such activity is considered an "armed attack"'6 against
the United States and that they are in jeopardy of being on the
receiving end of a forceful, law-of-war response by the most
powerful military on the planet?'
Of course, if something really is just vandalism, the law
enforcement paradigm, with its very limited response options,
would suffice. But when malevolent cyber activity endangers the
reliability of the internet in a world heavily dependent on a secure
cyberspace, it is not merely vandalism. Rather, it is a national and
international security threat that ought to be characterized and
treated as such.' Unfortunately, the United States' current
approach is too inscrutable and even contradictory to send an
effective deterrence message to potential cyber actors. This needs
to change.
This article proceeds in seven parts. Part II describes a recent
breach of United States cyber security and the inherent
vulnerability it reveals. Part III outlines the jumbled U.S. response
to cyber-attacks and the current orientation of U.S. policy on the
matter. Part IV argues that an ambiguous U.S. policy that leans
toward a law enforcement approach rather than going through the
law of war architecture is thwarting cyber deterrence. Even if
5 Jilian Mincer, Companies Urged to Use Multiple Vendors in Wake of Cyber
Attack, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2016, 9:40 PM), http://www.reuters.comlarticle/us-usa-cyber-
companies-idUSKCN120041 [https://perma.cc/L6MIH-GTZV].
6 Collin Allan, Was the Cyber Attack on a Dam in New York an Armed Attack?,
JUST SECURITY (Jan. 8, 2016, 1:10 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/28720/cyber-
attack-dam-armed-attack/ [https://perma.cc/4EWN-ZT36].
7 See Jeremy Bender, RANKED: The World's 20 Strongest Militaries, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 21, 2016, 10:24 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/these-are-the-
worlds-20-strongest-militaries-ranked-2016-4 [https://perma.cclNL7X-ZU2L].
8 See Cristina Dolan, Cybersecurity Is A Global Threat To Democracy, Yet Not
Well Understood, FORBES TECH. COUNCIL (Nov. 7, 2016, 9:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2016/11/07/cybersecurity-is-a-global-
threat-to-democracy-yet-not-well-understood/#5a5302375c2f [https://perma.cc/5UEM-
T2PL].
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recent cyber-attacks are not life threatening, the failure to establish 
an adequate proportionate response to these attacks will only 
incentivize further threats against U.S. national security [Part V]. 
Part VI explains how clarifying the law will ultimately enhance 
cyber deterrence. Finally, Part VII develops a broader view of the 
implications for Russia and China's mutual influence on cyber 
security law and the development of international norms. This 
article concludes with a thought to the future [Part VIII]. With 
each cyber-attack that passes without adequate response or proper 
characterization, the U.S. and others risk losing the global debate 
on cyber security and the role of International Humanitarian Law 
in deterring these forms of attack. 
II. "A stunning breach of global internet stability."
Already it is evident that the United States has a cyber
deterrence problem.9 Consider the massive disruption of the 
Internet10 that took place on October 21, 2016.u Twitter, PayPal, 
Spotify, and many other popular websites were virtually shut 
down when Dyn, a domain name system12 ("DNS") provider that 
functions as a "switchboard" for an enormous amount of internet 
traffic, was shut down. Reuters characterized the cyber crisis as "a 
stunning breach of global internet stability ."13 
What made .this cyber incident especially worrisome was that 
expert "attackers apparently used tens of thousands of hacked 
internet devices-household appliances such as digital video 
recorders, security cameras, and internet routers-to generate a 
massive amount of digital traffic" that jammed the system and 
grounded it to a halt several times.14 
Although Web functionality was more or less reconstituted by 
the end of the day, the Dyn attack may signal things to come. A 
9 See generally O'Brien, supra note 2 (discussing how a number of popular 
websites were inaccessible to some users "in a massive cyberattack with international 
reach"). 
10 See id. 
11 See Menn et al., supra note 1. 
12 See id. 
13 Id. 
14 Steven Melendez, After Years Of Warnings, Internet Of Things Devices To
Blame For Big Internet Attack, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 23, 2016, 8:35 AM), 
https:/ /www.fastcompany.com/3064904/after-years-of-warnings-intemet-of-things­
devices-to-blame-for-bi g-intemet-attack [https://perma.cc/Z324-H3CZ]. 
N.C. J. INT'L L.
retired intelligence officer ominously suggested that it may have
been a probing attack-that is, one designated to enable an
attacker to "eventually launch a devastating, Pearl Harbor-type
cyber-attack."" Bruce Schneier commented that even before the
most recent incident, the "precisely calibrated [cyber] attacks"" of
recent months "feel[] like a nation's military cybercommand trying
to calibrate its weaponry in the case of cyberwar.""
Nation-states are not alone in the quest to deter nefarious
internet activity, as non-state actors can also cause serious
disruption. For example, Mr. James Clapper, the Director of
National Intelligence, indicates that "it 'appears to be preliminarily
the case"' that a non-state actor may be responsible for the Dyn
attacks.'8 Regardless, the vulnerability to a range of hostile actors
is painfully evident: the devices exploited in this event, which are
made with some parts "coming from Chinese suppliers [and] have
weak or no password protections," are extremely common." Intel
Corporation predicts that the world will have 200 billion of such
devices by 2020, so it is unlikely that we have seen the last of
these cyber emergencies.20
III. Cyber Vandalism or Digital Acts of War?
Surveying the wide-ranging impact of the Dyn web calamity,
15 RC Porter, Massive Cyber Attack on the Internet Underway; Is This a Probe?
And, Part of a Larger Strategy by a Nation-State, Terrorists, Others - To Launch a
Cyber Pearl Harbor-Type Attack?, FORTUNA'S CORNER (Oct. 21, 2016),
http://fortunascorner.com/2016/10/21/massive-cyber-attack-on-the-intemet-underway-is-
this-a-probe-and-part-of-a-larger-strategy-by-a-nation-state-terrorists-others-to-launch-a-
cyber-pearl-harbor-type-attack/ [https://perma.cc/P8DU-SMBR] [hereinafter Massive
Cyber Attack].
16 Bruce Schneier, Someone Is Learning How to Take Down the Internet, SCHNEIER
ON SECURITY (Sept. 13, 2016),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/09/someone-islear.html
[https://perma.cc/D5EB-PLYY].
17 Id.
18 Laura Wagner, US. Intelligence Chief Says Internet Outage Was Likely the Work
of a Non-State Actor, SLATE (Oct. 26, 2016, 12:00 PM),
http://www.slate.comlblogs/future-tense/2016/10/26/james-clapper-says-intemet-outag
e_was_1ikely-the-work_of a-nonstateactor.html [https://perma.cc/Y5DH-9V93].
19 David Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, A New Era of Internet Attacks Powered by
Everyday Devices, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 22, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/us/politics/a-new-era-of-internet-attacks-powered-
by-everyday-devices.html?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/9R6C-7P3Z].
20 See id.
[Vol. XLII992
2017  993 
an analyst observed that "[e]ven though [the malware involved in 
the attack is] not a physical bomb, it has some similar effects."21 
The question then is-does the United States consider this 
unprecedentedly severe incident, involving as it does a cyber 
capability that has similar effects to a physical bomb, to be a 
digital act of war? 
Evidently not. Even though the facts of the massive shutdown 
would seem to equate the incident with a traditional kinetic attack, 
NBC news reports a senior U.S. intelligence official as rather 
dismissively classifying the incident as just "a classic case of 
internet vandalism."22 
The official's characterization conforms to what the United 
States has said previously about the legal status of certain cyber 
events. It is important to understand that "act of war" is a political 
term, not one of international law. In the post-UN Charter era, the 
"act of war" idiom is at odds with the underlying thrust of the 
Charter and especially Article 2(4).23 Article 2(4) demands that 
"[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations."24 In essence, "war" as it 
is historically understood, is all but illegal; disputes are to be 
resolved by peaceful means. 
There are, however, narrow exceptions to the prohibitions 
against the use of force. Force is allowed when the Security 
Council authorizes it under Article 42 of the Charter .25 
Additionally, a nation may employ force in self-defense when it 
has suffered what Article 51 describes as an "armed attack."26
21 O'Brien, supra note 2. 
22 Berkeley Lovelace, Dyn Says Cyberattack "Resolved" After Services Shut Down, 
NBC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/dyn-says­
cy berattack-resolved-after-services-shut-down-n670926 [https:/ /perma.cc/EJ2R-NFB2]. 
23 U.N. Charter art. 2, �4. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. art. 42. 
26 Id. art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not 
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the 
N.C. J. INT'L L.
The law does not define exactly what form of forceful response
a country may take in a legitimate act of self-defense except to say
it must be necessary and proportional.27 Nor does it limit a self-
defense response in a cyber-situation to an "in-kind" response.28
The United States, for example, could initiate a self-defense
response to a cyber-attack which might include the use of
traditional kinetic force involving conventional military weapons.29
The language of the United States' response to the Dyn attack
renders unclear as to when the United States considers itself to
have suffered an "armed attack" in the cyber context, so as to
trigger a right to self-defense under Article 51. Despite the
enormous dimensions of the Dyn onslaught, the official's claim
that it is simply "cyber vandalism" (as opposed to any sort of
"attack") seems to suggest that the U.S. doesn't consider it serious
enough to permit a self-defense response within the meaning of
Charter. This characterization is rather ironic as the United States
has previously expressed a rather aggressive stance regarding what
sort of cyber incidents could authorize forceful acts in self-
defense.
In a seminal 2012 speech, the then-Legal Advisor to the State
Department Harold Koh staked out the U.S. position.30 Initially,
he affirmed that the "established jus ad bellum rules do apply to
uses of force in cyberspace."3 1 He went on to explain that "cyber
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain
or restore international peace and security."). Most nations also believe Article 51
incorporates an inherent right to act in anticipatory self-defense when an armed attack
against them is imminent.
27 U.N. Charter arts. 42, 51.
28 Id.
29 See Graham Allison, How the US and China Will Go To War, NATIONAL
INTEREST (Apr. 12, 2017), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-america-china-could-
stumble-war-20150?page=7 [https://perma.cc/J2MK-ZRZ9] (explaining that a country,
in this instance China, could use kinetic weapons as a result on a mainland attack).
30 Ellen Nakashima, Cyber Attacks Could Trigger Self-Defense Rule, U.S. Official
Says, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/us-official-says-cyberattacks-can-trigger-self-defense-
rule/2012/09/18/c2246cla-0202-1 1e2-b260-
32f4a8db9b7e-story.html?utmterm=.2f59aab3e7be [https://perma.cc/JF45-35A5].
31 Chris Borgen, Harold Koh On International Law in Cyberspace, OPINIO JURIS
(Sept. 19, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/09/19/harold-koh-on-international-law-in-
cyberspace/ [https://perma.cc/2BD4-QXQ3]; Karma Nabulsi, Jus Ad Bellwn/ Jus In
Bello, CRIMES OF WAR, http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/jus-ad-bellum-jus-in-
bello/ [https://perma.cc/B3WU-82AL] (Jus ad bellum is that "branch of law that defines
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act1v1tJ.es that proximately result in death, m3ury, or significant 
[physical] destruction would likely be viewed as a use of force."32
Pointedly, he also said that "if the physical consequences of a 
cyber-attack work the kind of physical damage that dropping a 
bomb or firing a missile would, that cyber-attack should equally be 
considered a use of force."33 In light of the claim that last week's
incident has "some similar effects" to a "physical bomb," was the 
Koh threshold met? Or does the absence of "death, injury, or 
significant destruction" make it fall short in the U.S.' s view?34
It is not clear. Koh makes it hard to determine because he said 
that the U.S. "has for a long time taken the position that the 
inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal 
use of force" adding that "[in the U.S.'s] view, there is no 
threshold for a use of deadly force to qualify as an 'armed attack' 
that may warrant a forcible response."35 In other words, from the
U.S. perspective, there is no difference between "force" as used in 
Article 2 of the UN Charter and "armed attack" as used in Article 
51.36
This interpretation of the law is, internationally, a distinctly 
minority view, as Professor Michael Schmitt and other cyberlaw 
experts have noted.37 It creates a complication because most
interpretations of international law find that there are actions 
which might constitute "force" under Article 2, but not involve the 
kind of proximate "death, injury, or significant destruction" 
typically associated with an "armed attack."38 Citing Nicaragua v. 
U.S., Schmitt provides an illustration with obvious implications for
the U.S. position on cyber uses of force:
[f]he International Court of Justice held that although merely
funding guerrillas who were conducting hostilities against
the legitimate reasons a state may engage in war and focuses on certain criteria that 
render a war just."). 
32 Borgen, supra note 31. 
33 Id.
34 O'Brien, supra note 2. 
35 Borgen, supra note 31. 
36 See Andrew C. Foltz, Stu.xnet, Schmitt Analysis, and The Cyber "Use-Of-Force"
Debate, 67 JFQ 40, 41-42 (2012). 
37 Id.
38 See Michael N. Schmitt, International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and
Tallinn Manualluxtaposed, 54 HARV. INT'LLJ.13, 19 (2012). 
N.C. J. INT'L L.
another State did not reach the use of force threshold, arming
and training them did. The holding suggests that an act need not
have immediate physical consequences to comprise a use of
force.3 9
When the Nicaragua holding is juxtaposed with Koh's
assertion that "force" and "armed attack" are conterminous, it
seems that the United States should consider a grave cyber event
like the Dyn attack as the legal equivalent to an "armed attack"
even if it did not produce "death, injury, or significant
destruction."40 After all, if the U.S. position is that any use of
force is enough to justify an Article 51 response, disrupting half
the global internet with a methodology with effects similar to a
"physical bomb" would certainly seem to be at least as significant
as arming and training guerrillas in a single country.
To consider an incident as severe as the Dyn case as sufficient
to put the perpetrators at risk of a forceful self-defense response
not only would conform to the existing U.S. interpretation, but
also could signal a norm evolution consonant with Article 51. The
2013 Tallinn Manual, which many consider to be the leading
treatise on the international law applicable to cyberwar, does find
that "force" as used in Article 2(4) is different from the arguably
more egregious "armed attack" as set out in Article 51.41 At the
same time, however, its included commentary reports that the
group of experts who drafted the Tallinn Manual found the law
was "unsettled" as to whether "actions that do not result in injury,
death, damage or destruction, but which otherwise have extensive
negative effects" could amount to an armed attack.42
In fact, we may be seeing a shift towards broader acceptance of
the idea that cyber incidents with widespread adverse effects are
enough to trigger an Article 51 response, even without any
physical injuries or damage. In 2015, two years after the issuance
of the Tallinn Manual, Professor Schmitt, who was the project's
director, agreed that if a cyber operation shut down the national
39 Id. at 20; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Summary of the Summary of the Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/?sum=367&pl=3&p2=3&case=70&p3=5
[https://perma.cc/UB4L-XVDW].
40 See Schmitt, supra note 38.
41 MICHAEL N. ScHM-Ir ET AL., TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 42 (2013).
42 Id. at 56.
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economy without death or destruction, it would nevertheless 
"probably" meet the more demanding "armed attack" threshold.43
In addition, UCLA's Professor Kristen Eichensehr noted the 
conundrum that "cyber weapons create the possibility of actions 
that cause severe harm to the victim, but nevertheless do not result 
in physical damage or injury to persons."44 Consequently, she
predicted, "it is possible that over time a cyber-specific definition 
of armed attack may arise that does not require physical harm, 
even though physical harm is required for armed attacks caused by 
other sorts of weapons."45 With the experience of the Dyn case, 
that time may be now. 
The U.S. interpretation of the law would seem to be open to 
such a finding. In the first place, the 2015 U.S. Department of 
Defense's ("DoD") Law of War Manual ("Manual") confirms in 
Chapter XVI ("Cyber Operations") that the law of war applies to 
cyber, but admits that "[p ]recisely how the law of war applies to 
cyber operations is not well-settled, and aspects of the law in this 
area are likely to continue to develop, especially as new cyber 
capabilities are developed and States determine their views in 
response to such development."46 
Next, the Manual goes on to essentially incorporate the Koh 
approach _by saying, "if cyber operations cause effects that, if 
caused by traditional physical means, would be regarded as a use 
of force under }us ad bellum, then such cyber operations would 
likely also be regarded as a use of force."47 This intriguingly
suggests that a use of force sufficient for jus ad bell um might exist 
even in the absence of physical injuries or destruction. 
How? In listing examples of acts that could meet the use of 
force standard, the Manual says: "cyber operations that cripple a 
military's logistics systems, and thus its ability to conduct and 
sustain military operations, might also be considered a use of force 
43 Ryan Fairchild, When Can a Hacker Start a War?, PACIFIC STANDARD (Feb. 6, 
2015), https://psmag.com/when-can-a-hacker-start-a-war-9a59bfcf9526#.ktt4xu55p 
[https://perma.cc/A6FH-HDAR]. 
44 Kristen E. Eichensehr, Cyberwar & International Law Step Zero, 50 TEX. lNT'L 
LJ. 355,374 (2015). 
45 Id. 
46 OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP'T. OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL 994 (June 2015) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL]. 
47 Id. at 998. 
under jus ad bellum." 48 The footnote supporting this proposition
points to a 1999 publication, An Assessment of International Legal
Issues in Information Operations, by the DoD Office of the
General Counsel .49 That document says:
Even if the systems attacked were unclassified military logistics
systems, an attack on such systems might seriously threaten a
nation's security. For example, corrupting the data in a nation's
computerized systems for managing its military fuel, spare parts,
transportation, troop mobilization, or medical supplies may
seriously interfere with its ability to conduct military operations.
In short, the consequences are likely to be more important than
the means used.50
This illustrates that at least from the DoD's perspective, if a
cyber event has significant a casus belli even in the absence of
physical injuries or destruction. The relevant question then would
be: doesn't an assault that caused "a stunning breach of global
internet stability" and shut down half the internet qualify?
Complicating the issue is the July 2016 testimony before
Congress by the State Department's Coordinator for Cyber Issues,
Christopher Painter as to what he called "digital acts of war."5 '
According to Painter, in determining on a "case-by-case, fact-
specific" basis whether a cyber activity constitutes an "armed
attack" "sufficient to trigger ... [the] right of self-defense," "the
actual or anticipated effects of a particular incident" are of
"primary importance. Painter says "the U.S. government
believes that states should consider the nature and extent of injury
or death to persons and the destruction of, or damage to,
property."53 If the cyber act "proximately" causes "death, injury,
48 Id. at 998-99.
49 Id. at 999 n.21.
50 Id. (quoting in an explanatory parenthetical the OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP'T.
OF DEF., AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS
(2nd ed., 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INT'L L. STUDIES 459, 483
(2002)).
51 See Digital Acts of War: Evolving the Cybersecurity Conversation: Hearing on
"Digital Acts of War: Evolving the Cybersecurity Conversation" Before the H. Comm.
on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittees on Information Security and
National Security, 114th Cong. 4 (2016) (testimony of Christopher M. E. Painter,
Coordinator for Cyber Issues, U.S. Department of State).
52 Id.
53 Id.
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or significant destruction" it "likely would be viewed as an armed 
attack."54 
The problem, of course, is that while Painter's formulation 
includes the· obvious "death, injury, or significant destruction" 
standard,55 it does not necessarily preclude finding that non­
destructive cyber events could also produce "actual or anticipated 
effects"56 sufficient to permit an Article 51 response. It seems that
Painter intentionally meant to be rather enigmatic as he also 
claims: 
As a general matter, states have not sought to define precisely 
(or state conclusively) what situations would constitute armed 
attacks in other domains, and there is no reason cyberspace 
should be different. In fact, there is a good reason not to 
articulate a bright line, as strategic ambiguity could very well 
deter most states from getting close to it. 
IV. Does Calling a Severe Disruption "Cyber Vandalism"
Deter or Incentivize?
While there may be a place for ambiguity in strategic
deterrence, the Dyn cyberattack of late 2016 shows that it is not 
working for the United States. The reason for this could well be 
the trivializing public characterization the government has been 
giving to events like the Dyn incident, in addition to the 
government's tendency to apply similar language even when 
physical damage actually results. In the law, words do matter. 
Portraying something as "cyber vandalism" would not permit the 
United States to legally respond in the same way it could if it had 
been struck by a "physical bomb." This discrepancy in incident 
description could have serious consequences for the development 
of deterrence in relation to cyber events. 
Put another way, vandalism is ordinarily understood as a minor 
criminal law matter involving judicial processes, and not 
something that would sanction the use of force. As an 
international law matter, retorsion57 and countermeasures58 might 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 What is Retorsion, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910), 
http://thelawdictionary.org/retorsion/ [https://perma.cc/HLF8-UASL]. 
58 Michael N. Schmitt, "Below the Threshold" Cyber Operations: The 
be available as responses to vandalism-as may other remedies
under the law of state responsibility 5 9-but none of these options
allow the use of force. By contrast, activities that equate to
"physical bombs" could readily be viewed as a national security
threat sufficient to prompt a pre-emptive response, where an
acceptable response could be the necessary and proportional use of
force to counter them.' To reiterate, the law enforcement
paradigm suggested by "vandalism" is very different from the law
of war architecture that arises from national security threats, as the
"law enforcement" response to vandalism is much more limited.6 1
Yet even where the cyber incident unquestionably fulfills the
"physical damage" criteria, the United States inexplicably softens
its classification. For example, in 2014, President Obama used the
term "cybervandalism" in denying that North Korea's cyber
operation against Sony Pictures constituted an "act of war." 62
However, the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy document
released in April of 2015" described the Sony incident in much
more serious terms, saying:
North Korea conducted a cyberattack against Sony Pictures
Entertainment, rendering thousands of Sony computers
inoperable and breaching Sony's confidential business
information. In addition to the destructive nature of the attacks,
North Korea stole digital copies of a number of unreleased
movies, as well as thousands of documents containing sensitive
data regarding celebrities, Sony employees, and Sony's business
Countermeasures Response Option and International Law, 54 VA. INT'L LJ. 697,700-
01 (2014) (defining countermeasures).
59 See G.A. Res. 56/83, 223-25 (Dec. 12, 2001) (describing remedies available in
different courts based on the law of state responsibility).
60 See RYAN DOWDY ET AL., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 38 (5th ed. 2015)
(reaffirming the use of preemptive force against rogue states that present a threat to the
United States).
61 See Jan Hessbruegge, The Right to Life as the Jus ad Bellum of Non-
International Armed Conflict (A Reply to Lieblich), JUST SECURITY (OcT. 27, 2016, 1:48
PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/33906/life-jus-ad-bellum-non-international-armed-
conflict-a-reply-lieblich/ [https://perma.cc/RUA7-WJ6E] (stating "[u]nder international
law, the human right to life tightly limits the use of lethal force to contain threats to law
and order").
62 Eric Bradner, Obama: North Korea's Hack Not War, But 'Cybervandilism',
CNN (Dec. 24, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/21/politics/obama-north-koreas-
hack-not-war-but-cyber-vandalism/ [https://perma.cclV4Z6-LJGU].
63 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., THE DOD CYBER STRATEGY (2015).
N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLII1000
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operations. North Korea accompanied their cyberattacks with 
coercion, intimidation, and the threat of terrorism. The North 
Korean attack on Sony was one of the most destructive 
cyberattacks on a U.S. entity to date.64 
Likewise, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 
and Counterterrorism, Lisa Monaco, said in July of 2016 that the 
Sony attack "had crossed a threshold," adding that it "was both 
destructive, it fried the computers of Sony Pictures, took them 
offline[,] and it was coercive."65 Given the evidence of physical
destruction, it is hard to argue that the Sonny attack did not meet 
the United States' -and indeed the world's- definition of "armed 
attack." 
Regarding last summer's hack of thousands of Democratic 
National Committee ("DNC") emails, Ms. Monaco emphasized 
the gravity of the event, calling it a "serious, serious issue, a 
serious thing if there is deliberate intrusion for the purpose of 
coercing and influencing the political process."66 The distinctive 
nature of the target-the U.S. election system-caused John 
Brennan, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to conclude 
that "[ o ]bviously interference in the U.S. election process is a 
very, very serious matter ."67 
Despite the consensus about the seriousness and uniqueness of 
cyber efforts to interfere with the political process, the President 
again sought to downplay the incidents. In early September, he 
"acknowledged that the Russians have been attacking U.S. 
institutions on the intemet"68 but has also said that: 
64 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
65 THE ASPEN INST., ASPEN �ECURITY FORUM 2016: THE VIEW FROM THE WEST 
WING 13 (2016), http://aspensecurityforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07 /lisa-
monaco-the-view-from-the-west-wing .pdf [https://perma.cc/2QXX-MMVB]. 
66 Id. at 17; see also Aaron Blake, Here are the Latest, Most Damaging Thing in
the DNC's Leaked · Emails, FIX (July 25, 2016), 
https:/ /www .washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/20 l 6/07 /24/here-are-the-latest-most­
damaging-things-in-the-dncs-leaked-emails/?utm_term= .9c955ec7 c00d 
[https://perma.cc/C2WR-DR7S] (regarding the DNC hack). 
67 THE ASPEN INST., ASPEN SECURITY FORUM 2016: A CANDID CONVERSATION WITH 
THE DIRECTOR OF THE CIA 29 (2016), http://aspensecurityforum.org/wp­
content/uploads/2016/07 /a-candid-con versation-wi th-the-director-of-the-cia.pdf 
[https:/ /perma.cc/XU94-KEYY]. 
68 Dave Boyer, Obama Says He Doesn't Want 'Wild West' Cyberwar with Russia,
WASH. TIMES (Sep. 5, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/5/obama­
says-he-doesnt-want-wild-west-cyberwar-russi/ [h ttps:/ /perma.cc/UT 43-XRRG]. 
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Our goal is not to suddenly in the cyber arena duplicate a cycle
of escalation that we saw when it comes to other arms races in
the past, but rather to start instituting some norms so that
everybody's acting responsibly .... What we cannot do is have
a situation in which suddenly this becomes the wild, wild West,
where countries that have significant cybercapacity start
engaging in unhealthy competition or conflict through these
means. 69
By early October, the U.S. government was nevertheless
explicitly accusing the Russian government of directing what the
U.S. government was calling "compromises" of-but not "attacks"
on-cyber systems.70 The U.S. government claimed that "thefts
and disclosures" were "intended to interfere with the [U.S.]
election process."" Without referencing a legal basis, Josh Ernest,
the White House Press Secretary, said in October 2016-before
the Dyn case-that there would be no legal response to these
"thefts and disclosures."7 2  Ernest therefore added to the legal
muddle because, although there was no legal response, he insisted
that there would be a "proportional" response."
The response to a criminal matter like a "compromise" or
"disclosure" or even a "theft" is a judicial one; a "proportional"
response is, however, the language of force sounding in jus ad
bellum, not law enforcement. Confusingly, he also said it "is
unlikely that our response would be announced in advance"74 -
again, jus ad bellum terms mixed with criminal law rhetoric. It is
true, that an "armed attack" could also be a criminal offense, but
the way it is being publicly presented suggests little cognizance of
the critical differences between the two legal regimes, or the effect
69 Id.
70 Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Joint Statement from the
Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on
Election Security (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/joint-statement-
department-homeland-security-and-office-director-national [https://perma.cc/3SVK-
CTNP].
71 Id.
72 Josh Ernest, Press Sec'y, The White House, Press Gaggle by Press Sec'y Josh
Ernest en route to Greensboro, NC (Oct. 11, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/1 1/press-gaggle-press-
secretary-josh-earnest-en-route-greensboro-nc [https://perma.cc/Y5ZM-DVYU]
[hereinafter Ernest Press].
73 Id.
74 Id.
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on deterrence those differences might have. 
V. Deterrence and Dithering?
Mr. Ernest further complicated the matter when he asserted
"[i]t's certainly possible that the President could choose response 
options that we never announce."75 This is hardly what would or
should occur if the actions were really just vandalism-a criminal 
law matter-and is not the way to go about deterring actors from 
similar behavior. How will people be deterred if the consequences 
are unknown? Adding to the confusion are press reports that 
suggest experts are not optimistic about the United State's vision 
of what the "proportional" response should be; announced or not. 
Harvard Law Professor Jack Goldsmith,76 long a critic of what 
he calls the United State's "feckless" cyber deterrence policy ,77 
warned that the U.S. government's "dithering"78 in response to 
previous cyber incidents (including the 2015 Office of Personnel 
Management data breach 79 that may have affected as many as 22 
million people80) was dangerous. Professor Goldsmith avowed 
that: 
Such a pattern of vacillation in response to very damaging 
cyber-operations will not deter our adversaries; it will embolden 
them. It will especially embolden them since the responses the 
USG finally settles on are much less than proportionate to the 
75 Id.
76 Jack Landman Goldsmith is the Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law at Harvard 
University. Professor Goldsmith previously served in the Justice Department and 
Department of Defense during the George W. Bush Administration. 
http://hls.harvard.edu/facul ty /directory/ 10320/Goldsmith [https:/ /perma .cc/LA3 F-W 44S]. 
77 Jack Goldsmith, The United States' Feckless Cyber Deterrence Policy, LAWFARE 
(Aug. 1, 2015), https://www .lawfareblog.com/united-states-feckless-cyber-deterrence­
policy [https://perma.cc/7UWV-XGYD]. 
78 Jack Goldsmith, The DNC Hack and (the Lack of) Deterrence, LAWFARE (Oct. 9, 
2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/dnc-hack-and-lack-deterrence 
[https://perma.cc/M54B-Y QDL]. 
79 Cybersecurity Resource Center, OPM.GOV, 
https://www .opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/ [https://perrna.cc/6D8X-
Y288]. 
80 David Perera, Chaffetz: OPM Data Breaches May Affect 32 Million, POLITICO
(June 24, 2015),http://www.politico.corn/story/2015/06/opm-data-breach-jason-chaffetz-
119374 [https://perma.cc/J4TT-2H59] (explaining that 22 million was the figure issued 
by the OPM). 
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81damage caused.
Susan Hennessy, a legal scholar at the Brookings Institute,
differed somewhat with Goldsmith and instead asserted that U.S.
deterrence policy has been successful to the extent that the United
States "has never been the victim of a cyber-attack that genuinely
threatened lives."8 2 She also helpfully notes that the "[Obama]
Administration quietly released its policy on cyber deterrence late
last year."" The policy stated: "the Administration is most
concerned about threats that could cause wide-scale disruption,
destruction, loss of life, and significant economic consequences for
the United States and its interests."84 Such attacks would include
(but are not limited to):
Cyber-attacks or other malicious cyber activity intended to
cause casualties;"
Cyber-attacks or other malicious cyber activity intended to
cause significant disruption to the normal functioning of U.S.
society or government, including attacks against critical
infrastructure that could damage systems used to provide key
services to the public or the government;8 6
Cyber-attacks or other malicious cyber activity that
threatens the command and control of U.S. military forces, the
freedom of maneuver of U.S. military forces, or the infrastructure
on which the U.S. military relies to defend U.S. interests and
commitments; 87
Malicious cyber activity that undermines national
economic security through cyber-enabled economic espionage or
sabotage.8
Hennessey believes that tampering with the mechanisms of the
election is still a "below the threshold" activity (that is, below the
"armed attack" standard), although she agrees that such actions
81 Goldsmith, supra note 78.
82 Susan Hennessey, Is US Deterrence Strategy More than (Russian) Roulette?,
LAWFARE (Oct. 12, 2016, 1:16 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-cyber-deterrence-
strategy-more-russian-roulette [https://perma.cc/J6ED-9363].
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Hennessey, supra note 82.
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combined with others might collectively exceed it.89 She also 
points to Phil Walters' work,90 describing a sophisticated Russian 
strategy to employ various "below established threshold activities" 
("BET A"), and its relation to deterrence.91 Ms. Hennessey argues 
that while the United States' deterrence is working, in that it is 
"effectively preventing very serious activity, at least for now," its 
responses to BET A," are reactive and unpredictable, which 
undercuts the deterrent effect."92 She closes by articulating a
belief that: 
U.S. deterrence policy currently has the feeling of roulette. 
Maybe the house still wins overall, but it is clear that actors like 
Russia are happy to keep spinning the wheel while they're 
ahead.93 
Less than two weeks after Hennessey wrote her piece, an 
undeterred actor launched the Dyn assault that hobbled half of the 
Web.94 Even the Department of Homeland Security admitted just 
a month before the Dyn attack that the U.S. "has experienced 
increasingly severe and significant cyber incidents affecting both 
the private sector and Federal Govemment."95 That admission, 
along with the new Dyn case, ought to make it clear that the 
United States needs to retool its cyber deterrence strategy. 
VI. What to Do?
Clarifying the law on cyber security and the rights of countries
to self-defense against cyber-attacks will help to alleviate these 
struggles with ambiguity. 
89 Id. 
90 Phil Walter, National Security Adaptations to Below Established Threshold 
Activities, LAWFARE (Aug. 15, 2016, 8:37 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/national­
security-adaptations-below-established-threshold-activities [https://perma.cc/3ZZA­
BTNG]. 
91 Id. (discussing Russian use of hybrid warfare to avoid the checks imposed upon 
them by U.S. and NATO nuclear deterrents). 
92 Hennessey, supra note 82. 
93 Id. 
94 Andy Ozment, National Cyber Incident Response Plan Now Available for Public 
Comment, DEP'T HOMELAND SECURITY (Sep. 30, 2016), 
https: //www.dhs.gov/blog/2016/09/30/national-cy ber-incident-response-plan-now­
available-public-comment [https: / /perma.cc/HHN8-GFRT]. 
95 Id. 
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A. Clarifying Terms
Deterrence is a devilishly complex endeavor, especially where
cyber is concerned - but clarifying the law can help. Shortly after
the Dyn incident, Mr. Clapper lamented:
[W]e don't have enough body of law yet. We haven't, in my
opinion - this is not company policy; it's just me speaking -
but we have not been able to generate either the substance or the
psychology of deterrence in the cyber realm. And that's going
to continue to be an issue for us. 96
Regardless of whether Clapper is actually correct about
whether an adequate body of law exists to support deterrence, it is
true that many others have that perception. 7 In truth, the law itself
may not be as much as of a problem as the proper application of
the law (and especially the United States' view of it) to the facts.
That proper application can be facilitated by cleaning up the
language officials use in regards to cyber incidents, and to
synchronize it with announced U.S. interpretations.
To effectively deter, consistency and accuracy of language is
indispensable. Since the United States has elected to characterize
any use of force as sufficient to trigger a right to self- defense
under Article 51, when events occur that plainly meet that standard
(and even in the event that they cross the more demanding "armed
attack" threshold), then they need to be declared a use of force.
For example, if the descriptions by DoD and government officials
about the scope and intensity of the physical damage inflicted by
North Korea in the Sony cyber incident are accurate, it quite
obviously meets the standard establish in the Koh speech, the DoD
Law of War Manual, and Painter's testimony.9 8
96 Interview by Charlie Rose with James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence,
in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.cfr.org/intelligence/conversation-james-
clapper/p38426 [https://perma.cclL3CA-V98R].
97 See, e.g., Frank J Cilluffo and Sharon, Global Ransomware Attack Reinforces
Message of Trump's New Cybersecurity Order, THE CONVERSATION (May 12, 2017,
3:51 PM EDT), https://theconversation.com/global-ransomware-attack-reinforces-
message-of-trumps-new-cybersecurity-order-72239 [https://perma.cc/9ZCQ-LHV9]
("One crucial element that has been largely missing from American cybersecurity efforts
so far is cyber-deterrence.").
98 Harold Honhgu Koh, Legal Advisor of the Dep't of State, International Law in
Cyberspace,
Address to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012),
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edulfss-papers/4854 [https://perma.cc/5FFP-8RKM];
DoD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 46; Digital Acts of War - Evolving the
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Watering down official characterizations of the Sony attack 
(where computers were "fried" and "thousands" of them rendered 
"inoperable") to merely being an incident of cybervandalism 
carries real consequences. At best, confusion arises, and at worst, 
a norm develops that gives potential cyber adversaries reason to 
believe that even if they inflict damage on that level, scale, and 
intensity, they will not face anything worse than an indictment in a 
U.S. court-that will never result in an actual prosecution. 
To be sure, there are acts that may appropriately be 
characterized as solely cybervandalism. For example, in early 
2015 when Islamic State hackers penetrated U.S. Central 
Command99 social media accounts, the United States branded it as 
"purely a case of cybervandalism."100 Even though the hackers
posted "threatening messages and propaganda videos, along with 
some military documents," the command maintained that the 
"operation military networks were not compromised and there was 
no operational impact to U.S. Central Command."101 Every hostile
cyber activity cannot and should not be characterized as a use of 
force, even under the US's more permissive standard. 
It does help when, as noted above, the United States 
specifically defines the cyber activities it wants to explicitly 
deter.102 The problem with this is that it may include activities­
cyber espionage for example-that are rightly violative of 
domestic U.S. law, but would not necessarily be something that 
the United States and its allies would want to be considered in 
Cybersecurity Conversation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Information Security and 
National Security of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 114th Cong. 
(2016) (statement of Christopher M. E. Painter, Coordinator for Cyber Issues, U.S. 
Department of State). 
99 U.S CENTRAL COMMAND, http://www.centcom.mil/ [https://perma.cc/L99T-
6F7W]. 
!00 Dan Lamothe, U.S. Military Social Media Accounts Apparently Hacked by
Islamic State Sympathizers, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/01 / 12/centcom-twi tter-
account-apparentl y-hacked-by-islamic-state-sympathizers [https://perma.cc/8RHQ-
R46X]. 
101 Id.
!02 Report on Cyber Deterrence, WHITE HOUSE (December 2015), 
http:// 1 yxsm73 j7aop3quc9y5ifaw3. wpengine .netdna-cdn .com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/ l 2/Report-on-Cyber-Deterrence-Policy-Final .pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7726-MDGV]. 
international law, at least at the moment, as a casus belli.103 It may
be suitable for the development of new normsl0 4 not involving
force in light of the enormous capability of cyber methodologies,
but a clear delineation between what authorizes a forceful
response, and what is limited to other options is needed.
In short, for deterrence to work there needs to be more
precision in the official language used to describe specific
incidents that comports to the United States' own interpretation of
a use of force that would authorize a response in self-defense.os If
the facts show an incident being characterized as a use of force
sufficient to permit the use of force under Article 51, then the
official language needs to be consistent with that assessment.
B. Develop Norms for "Red Lines"
It is vitally important, however, to appreciate that simply
because a particular cyber act may legally constitute an "armed
attack" that might qualify for the political characterization of an
"act of war," that does not necessarily mean that a country is
obliged to respond to it with force. Indeed, there are many
political reasons that would counsel against doing so. This is
where Mr. Painter is mistaken in regards to his discussion about
"strategic ambiguity."l06
In deterrence, ambiguity may be useful with respect to a
response, but it is markedly less so when you are talking about the
threshold. Misunderstandings as to where the proverbial "red
lines" are set can lead to dangerous miscalculation, unintended
escalation, and unwanted conflict.o' Given the enormous potential
of cyber acts to do harm, potential actors ought not to get mixed
103 Casus Belli, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2017),
http://thelawdictionary.org/casus-belli/ [https://perma.cc/LQ3J-SWT9].
104 WILLIAM BANKS, CYBER ESPIONAGE, SURVEILLANCE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
FINDING COMMON GROUND (2014),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2558155 [https://perma.cc/G69G-
W5HX].
105 Laura K. Bate, In Search of Cyber Deterrence, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Sep. 24,
2015), https://warontherocks.com/2015/09/in-search-of-cyber-deterrence/
[https://perma.cc/X54N-EEDD].
106 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
107 Dot Wordsworth, What, Exactly, is a 'Red Line?', SPECTATOR (Jun. 8 2013),
https://www.spectator.co.uk/2013/06/that-red-line-were-not-supposed-to-cross-what-
exactly-is-it/ [https://perma.cc/S7UK-P36Z].
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messages as to how the United States considers harmful cyber 
activities. 
Frustrations with the opaqueness as what cyber activity would 
constitute a casus belli appears to have motivated Congressman 
Mike Rounds to propose a bill earlier this year that would require 
the President to develop a policy for determining "when an action 
carried out in cyberspace constitutes an act of war against the 
[United States] ."108 
Rounds points to testimony of Marine Lt. Gen. Vincent 
Stewart, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as part of his 
rational for the legislation.109 Stewart admitted that a "much fuller 
definition of the range of things that occur in cyber space [is 
needed], and then [ we should] start thinking about the threshold 
where an attack is catastrophic enough or destructive enough that 
we define it as an act of war, I think that would be extremely 
helpful."110 
Stewart is not alone in not "fully" understanding where the 
threshold lies. Other Pentagon leaders apparently are equally 
uncertain,m something that raises the obvious question: if our 
leaders do not know, how can we expect potential adversaries to 
understand which acts might spark a full-blown war? At the same 
time, except in the most aggravated cases, enumerating in advance 
precisely which cyber acts exceed the use of force threshold might 
be nearly impossible. 
This is where norm development in international law comes 
into play. In developing norms, the United States needs to use the 
language of international law. Political terms like "digital acts of 
war" are unhelpful not only because they do not track with the 
language of the law, but because they also can imply to the general 
public a level of response that is unnecessarily provocative and 
even inconsistent with the proportionality and necessity factors 
intrinsic to a lawful exercise of self-defense, especially in the 
108 Cyber Act of War Act of 2016, H.R. 5220, 114th Cong.§ I (2016). 
109 Mike Rounds, Defining a Cyber Act of War, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2016, 4:08 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/defining-a-cyber-act-of-war-1462738124 
[https:/ /perma.cc/6KVT-479C]. 
110 Id. 
lll Bryant Jordan, US Still Has No Definition/or Cyber Act of War, MILITARY.COM 
(Jun. 22, 2016), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/06/22/us-still-has-no-
definition-for-cyber-act-of-war.html [https://perma.cc/N68X-EXWP]. 
complex cyber arena.11
As discussed, the United States has, in fact, laid out in broad
terms what kind of cyber activities it wants to deter, and generally
how it interprets the law applicable to cyber operations.1 13 What is
required now is for the United States to act consistently with these
conceptual positions when cyber incidents actually occur. We
now seem to be in a cycle in which we are facing ever more
dangerous and damaging cyber incidents, yet they are rarely given
the appellations established U.S. legal interpretations would seem
to require. Instead, incidents too often are characterized with
language that would put them outside the kinds of activities that
would authorize a forceful Article 51 response.
The United States also has to be more forthright about its
response to incidents because that too influences norm
development. True, there may be times, as the White House
spokesman Josh Ernest said, that the United States would "never
announce" a response to a particular cyber incident, but that
should very much be the exception and not the rule.1 14 As
Bloomberg News' Eli Lake argued last July after the DNC hack:
[T]here is also a consequence for keeping quiet. It might give
Russian hackers the impression that the [United States] is
uninterested in deterring them. Indeed, it appears they are under
that impression already.115
Transparency should not be underestimated as a deterrence
factor.116 Potential cyber attackers calculate exactly what kind of
malicious activity will generate a response, and how costly that
response might be.
VII. The Bigger Picture
It is crucial that the United States unmistakably express its
positions about cyber incidents it has suffered, particularly given
112 Terry Gill, Anticipatory Self-Defense in the Cyber Context,. 89 INT'L. L. STUD.
438,460 (2013).
113 See, e.g., DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 46.
114 Ernest Press, supra note 72.
115 Eli Lake, Why Russia Keeps Getting Away With Hacking America, BLOOMBERG
(Jul. 31, 2016, 10:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-31/why-
russia-keeps-getting-away-with-hacking-america [https://perma.cc/HGW3-VH5K].
116 Laura K. Bate, In Search of Cyber Deterrence, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Sep. 24,
2015), https://warontherocks.com/2015/09/in-search-of-cyber-deterrence/
[https://perma.cc/Q4XL-97Y5].
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the approach of two of the world's most formidable cyber actors. 
Professor Schmitt noted in 2014 that: 
The UN Group of Governmental Experts, which includes 
representatives from Russia and China, agreed in 2013 that 
international law applies to cyberspace. Interestingly, Russia 
and China did not agree to a reference to international 
humanitarian law and China reportedly does not accept the 
applicability of IHL in cyberspace.117 
For example, the Chinese acknowledge that "although the 
existing laws on armed conflicts and general international 
principles may all apply to cyberspace, there are still many issues 
that need clarification ... [t]he international community should, 
therefore, revise existing laws[ -]but it is important that this 
international legal framework maintains sufficient openness and 
flexibility ."n8 
Although purportedly not officially speaking for the Chinese 
government, Professor Huang Zhi Xiong of China's Wuhan 
University Institute of International Law is reported to have shared 
the opinion that: 
In his view, the Tallinn factors relevant to evaluating when a 
cyber activity rises to a use of force (which include severity, 
directness, and invasiveness) are too malleable and the bar for 
what activities are uses of force should be higher. Second, he 
sought a higher bar than Tallinn 1.0 sets for when a state may 
invoke the right of self-defense. In his view, a state does not 
have a right of self-defense against attacks by non-state actors, 
nor does a state have the right of self-defense against an 
imminent attack.119 
If the Chinese government de facto adopts ( or has already 
adopted) Professor ZhiXiong's view as to the inapplicability of the 
right to self-defense in cyber incidents, and Russia fuses with that 
view, their combined impact would be very influential in the 
development of an international norm that is contrary to the U.S. 
view. 
117 Michael M. Schmitt, The Law of Cyber Warfare: Quo Vadis?, 25 STAN. L. &
PoL'Y REV. 269,271 n.7 (2014) (citation omitted). 
ll8 Li Zhang, A Chinese Perspective on Cyber War, 94 INT'L. REV. RED CROSS 801, 
804 (2012). 
119 Ashley Deeks, Tallinn 2 .0 and a Chinese View on the Tallinn Process, LA WFARE 
(May 31, 2015, 2:00 PM), https://www .lawfareblog.com/tallinn-20-and-chinese-view­
tallinn-process [https://perma.cc/L8QD-STXR]. 
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VIII. Conclusion
It is inarguable that the United States needs to be judicious in
its characterizations of, and responses to, cyber events.120 No one
wants to unnecessarily aggravate an already difficult situation.
Uncertainty as to how to effectively respond and still avoid
counterproductive escalation is a real problem of deterrence. But
before determining whether and how to respond, the legal options
need to be apparent. In that regard, the United States is at the
point where it needs to be more forthright when incidents occur
that appear to violate its own announced standards as to when a
cyber action equates to an "armed attack."
Again, calling something the equivalent of an "armed attack"
so as to permit a forceful and proportional response in self-defense
under Article 51 does not mean that such action would necessarily
be forthcoming in every instance. Rather, it would make it
unmistakable to all concerned that the United States asserts it has a
lawful option to use force in self-defense if it chooses to do so, not
that it will in each case.
As the United States fails to properly characterize cyber
incidents, and frequently suggests that they are simply vandalism,
thefts, or other matters which are readily interpreted by cyber
actors and publics around the world as being within the law
enforcement modality and outside of the jus ad bellum legal
regime, no one should be surprised if norms begin to emerge more
in keeping with what Russia, China, and hostile cyber actors
prefer.
Deterrence in the cyber realm quite obviously needs
strengthening, and dealing with the legal piece of that effort
matters. We still have the chance to set the record straight-to
develop that "body of law," Director Clapper believes we are
missing-but that opportunity diminishes with each passing
incident where the proper legal characterization is understated and
muddled.
120 Trevor Timm, If the US hacks Russia for Revenge, That Could Lead to
Cyberwar, GUARDIAN (Oct. 19, 2016, 11:17 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/19/russian-hacking-us-retaliation-
cyberwar-international-treaty [https://perma.cclFQ79-8HEC].
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